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Ralph Barton Perry notes that pragmatism is the movement 
that begins with William James's misunderstanding of Charles 
Sanders Peirce.1 Perry's observation is perceptive in two respects. 
First, James clearly misunderstood Peirce's pragmatic principle. 
Indeed, James's interpretation of Peirce's pragmatic point of view 
caused Peirce to change its name from pragmat i sm to 
"pragmaticism"—a term Peirce thought "ugly enough to be kept 
safe from kidnappers." 2 Peirce's strong reaction to James's 
misunderstanding is not without warrant. For, while Peirce stressed 
the universal and long-term consequences of a pragmatic way of 
thinking, James emphasized its particular and immediate ones. 
Secondly, although James himself acknowledged Peirce as the 
founder of pragmatism, the pragmatic movement did not truly begin 
with Peirce. Rather, pragmatism became a movement only when 
it became the object of James's concern. Perhaps, more than any 
other factor, James's inimitable manner of presentation—whether 
in the lecture hall or in print—brought the pragmatic way of 
thinking into the popular consciousness. By his own admission, 
James discovered in Peirce's principle a means of making 
philosophy a matter of public debate and concern. As Cornel West 
observes, James's contribution "consists of popularizing the 
personal and moral implications of the pragmatic perspective 
initiated by Peirce." 3 
Indeed, a concern for the personal and the moral implications 
of pragmatism dominates James's thinking. From early to late in 
his philosophical career, he occupies himself, in West's words, 
with "the heroic energies and reconciliatory strategies available to 
individuals." 4 No less consistent than James's concern for the 
personal and moral implications of pragmatism is his concern for 
its religious ones. The Gifford Lectures of 1901-02 (later published 
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as The Varieties of Religious Experience), as well as many of 
James's popular essays (e.g. 'The Will to Believe") serve as 
examples of this concern. But perhaps the most striking example 
of James's religious concern occurs in his more programmatic 
essays—those essays wherein James articulates his own pragmatic 
point of view. For example, in his Berkeley lecture of 1898, 
"Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results," James not only 
introduces Peirce's pragmatic principle, but he does so by 
employing it to resolve a debate between materialism and theism. 
Ultimately, as he goes on to argue, pragmatism decides in favor of 
the latter. Moreover, in his Lowell Institute Lectures of 1906 (later 
published as Pragmatism), religious themes occur throughout the 
work. After reading the lectures, James's friend and frequent 
correspondent, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., remarked, "I now see, 
as I have seen in his other books that I have read, that the aim and 
end of the whole business is religious." 5 Holmes's remark is 
striking, especially when we recall that James did not formally 
associate himself with any religious tradition, and he once described 
himself as having "no living sense of commerce with God." 6 
The purpose of this paper is to attempt to explain why 
pragmatic and religious themes are so closely intertwined in 
James's thought, even though he never considered himself to be a 
religious person. By way of procedure, I will begin by presenting 
James's understanding of God. As we shall see, James argues that 
the meaning of the concept of God is found in the difference it 
makes in the life of the believer. What is the difference that the 
concept of God makes in a believer's life? James provides the 
most dramatic answer to this question in his semi-autobiographical 
essay of 1895, "Is Life Worth Living?" Literally speaking, he 
claims, the difference that God makes in the life of the believer 
can be a matter of life and death. For, if the believer should become 
caught in the grip of melancholy and/or depression—even to the 
point of contemplating suicide—the disposition to believe, James 
argues, can free him from that grip, and to consider living anew. 
In a similar manner, James also maintains, from an epistemological 
perspective, that the disposition to believe can free us from the 
grip of old ways of thinking, and to begin thinking anew. The 
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ability to move beyond our old patterns of thinking, and thereby to 
develop new ideas and new truths, is a central theme in James's 
pragmatism. For this reason, I want to argue, he always harbored 
a deep sympathy and respect for religious belief, even though he 
never considered himself to be a religious person. 
I 
As I noted above, James both introduces and misinterprets 
Peirce's pragmatic principle in his Berkeley address of 1898, 
"Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results." Nonetheless, 
James's misunderstanding of Peirce's pragmatism is revealing. It 
is revealing both of James's own empiricist leanings (a bias he 
acknowledges toward the lec ture ' s conc lus ion) and his 
understanding of what constitutes the meaning and truth of a 
concept. James reformulates Peirce's principle in the following 
words: "And I should prefer for our purposes this evening to express 
Peirce's principle by saying that the effective meaning of any 
philosophic proposition can always be brought down to some 
particular consequence, in our future practical experience, whether 
active or passive; the point lying rather in the fact that the 
experience must be particular, than in the fact that it must be active. 
To take in the importance of this principle, one must get accustomed 
to applying it to concrete cases." 7 
James misinterprets Peirce's principle in two respects. First, 
while Peirce argues that the meaning of a concept consists in its 
universal and long-term consequences—i.e., in consequences that 
lead to the formation of habits—James maintains the opposite. 
According to him, the meaning of a concept resides in consequences 
which are particular and immediate. James's empiricist leanings 
determine, in no small way, his reformulation of Peirce's pragmatic 
principle; they also highlight a second point of difference between 
the two thinkers. For, while Peirce applies his principle to the 
pragmatic conception of meaning, James extends its application 
to that of truth. As James goes on to say, "Suppose there are two 
different philosophical definitions... If, by supposing the truth of 
the one, you can foresee no conceivable practical consequence to 
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anybody at any time or place, which is different from what you 
would foresee if you supposed the truth of the other, why then the 
difference between the two propositions is no difference—it is 
only a specious and verbal difference, unworthy of further 
contention." 8 Where Peirce carefully distinguishes between 
questions of meaning and truth, James conflates the two. This 
conflation of truth and meaning results in James's belief that the 
difference which a concept makes in a particular situation is the 
criterion for its meaning and truth. John Dewey is perceptive in 
commenting upon the establishment of this criterion in James's 
thinking. Dewey writes: 
The principal reason which led James to give new 
color to pragmatic method was that he was 
preoccupied with applying the method to 
determine the meaning of philosophical problems 
and questions, and that moreover, he chose to 
submit to examination philosophical notions of a 
theological or religious nature. He wished to 
establish a criterion which would enable one to 
determine whether a given philosophical question 
has an authentic and vital meaning or whether, on 
the contrary, it is trivial and purely verbal; and in 
the former case, what interests are at stake when 
one accepts and affirms one or the other of the 
two theses in dispute.9 
In James's mind, the most significant criterion — from a pragmatic 
point of view — is the difference that a concept makes in our 
lives; therein lies the criterion for its meaning and truth. James 
writes: "There can be no difference which doesn't make a difference 
— no difference in abstract truth which does not express itself in 
a difference of concrete fact, and of conduct consequent upon the 
fact, imposed on somebody, somehow, somewhere , and 
somewhen." 1 0 James's reformulation of Peirce's pragmatic 
principle, when applied to notions of a theological or religious 
nature, has significant and interesting implications. 
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On James's view, religion is predominantly "a living practical 
affair."" More specifically, religion, according to him, must 
concern itself with making sense out of the triumphs and tragedies 
of human living. Indeed, he is quite critical of dogmatic and 
scholastic theology for losing sight of this fact. For example, 
James argues, in his 1898 lecture, that many of the scholastic 
descriptions and formulations about God do not satisfy "practical 
Americans." They do not make a concrete difference in the life of 
the believer. "How does God's 'aseity' come home to youT\ James 
asks his audience. "What specific thing can I do to adapt my self 
to his "simplicity'?" 1 2 But, while he criticizes many of the abstract 
formulations of the scholastics, James does not discount all such 
formulations. In fact, he argues that the notions of God's 
omniscience and justice are quite legitimate because, in James's 
words, they have "practical connections with life." In other words, 
the notions of God's omniscience and justice make a concrete 
difference in the life of the believer. James respectively refers to 
these concepts by saying: "With the one [God] sees us in the dark, 
with the other he rewards and punishes what he sees." 1 3 
In James's opinion, then, the criterion for the meaning and 
truth of religious concepts lies in the consequences of their practical 
application. Ultimately, religious concepts must concern 
themselves with the concrete, practical affairs of men and women. 
Until we apply the concepts, say, of God's omniscience or justice 
to the particular situations of our human living, they remain, on 
James's view, empty abstractions. Once applied, however, the 
question about their meaning and truth becomes relevant and vital. 
Moreover, if we adjust our behavior because of these concepts, 
their meaning and truth become even more significant, insofar as 
they make a concrete difference in our lives. According to James, 
therefore, the meaning of the concept of God lies in the difference 
it makes in the conduct of the believer. For this reason, he argues, 
the only adequate conception of God is a pragmatic one, that is, 
the conception of a God who makes a difference in the life of the 
believer. As James puts it, "Now the principle of practicalism 
says that the very meaning of the conception of God lies in those 
differences which must be made in our experience if the conception 
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be true." 1 4 In the Berkeley lecture of 1898, James employs this 
pragmatic conception of God to settle the debate between theism 
and materialism. 
In the lecture, James argues that the vitality of the debate 
between theism and materialism depends upon certain conditions. 
First, he claims that the debate is only vital to a consciousness that 
is "prospective" in nature. And second, the debate is vital only in 
a universe that is largely "open." If consciousness is primarily 
"retrospective," and the universe is already a settled affair, then, 
James claims, the debate is merely an exercise in mental 
gymnastics, and it is not a very fruitful exercise at that! For, to 
James's way of thinking, it makes no sense to debate about whether 
God or matter is ultimately responsible for a universe in which the 
facts are already "bagged and captured." In such a universe, the 
choice between theistic and materialistic positions literally makes 
no difference; the facts are just as they are, and belief in God or 
matter does nothing to change them. James writes: "Calling matter 
the cause of [the universe] retracts no single one of the items that 
have made it up, nor does calling God the cause augment them." 1 5 
Thus, James maintains that where the universe is a closed and 
settled affair, and consciousness is largely retrospective, the debate 
between theism and materialism is idle and inconsequential. He 
continues: "Thus if no future detail of experience or conduct is to 
be deducted from our hypothesis, the debate between materialism 
and theism becomes quite idle and insignificant. Matter and God 
in that event mean exactly the same thing—the power, namely, 
neither more or less, that can make just this mixed, imperfect, yet 
completed world—and the wise man is he who in such a case would 
turn his back on such a supererogatory discussion." 1 6 
James believes, however, that consciousness is not primarily 
retrospective, nor is the universe a closed and settled affair. Rather, 
he claims that consciousness is essentially prospective in nature, 
and the universe is very much an open one. Under these conditions, 
the debate between theism and materialism becomes vital, and the 
pragmatic principle helps to resolve the issue between them. Under 
the conditions of a prospective consciousness and open universe, 
it makes a great difference whether God or matter is ultimately 
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responsible for the universe. To James's way of thinking, the 
difference is between a universe which ends in triumph and one 
which ends in tragedy. The materialist's conception of the universe, 
according to James, ends in tragedy. More specifically, the 
materialist conceives of a universe consisting of gradually depleting 
resources and diminishing energies; it is a universe steadily 
advancing toward its final end. James writes: "For, according to 
the theory of mechanical evolution, the laws of redistribution of 
matter and motion, though they are certainly to thank for all the 
good hours which our organisms have ever yielded us and for all 
the ideals which our minds now frame, are yet fatally certain to 
undo their work again, and redissolve everything that they have 
once evolved." 1 7 By contrast, the theist draws a radically different 
picture of the universe—i.e., one that is lively, and whose final 
word is triumph. Indeed, James argues, the concept of God 
guarantees such a triumph. Thus, he notes that what theism may 
lack in conceptual clarity it gains in practicality. James writes: 
The notion of God, on the other hand, however 
inferior it may be in c learness to those 
mathematical notions so current in mechanical 
philosophy, has at least this practical superiority 
over them, that it guarantees an ideal order that 
shall be permanently preserved. A world without 
God in it may burn up and freeze, but we then 
think of Him as still mindful of the old ideals and 
sure to bring them to fruition; so that, where he is, 
tragedy is only provisional and partial, and 
shipwreck and dissolution not the absolute final 
things. 1 8 
In this text, James is not being disingenuous or naive in making 
this claim. He knows from personal experience the struggles and 
trials that comprise human existence.1 9 But, as the text reveals, he 
argues that these struggles and trials do not have the final word; 
they are, at best, "provisional and partial," and the theistic 
conception of the universe guarantees their provisional nature. In 
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such a universe, the struggles and trials that initially weigh us down 
are eventually overcome. Thus, James criticizes materialism not 
for what it is, but for what it is not. That is to say, materialism 
cannot support the hopes and ideals that lay deep in the human 
heart. And these hopes are, in James's words, "the truly philosophic 
concern." Thus, with respect to the materialistic conception of 
the universe, he writes: "We make complaint of it. . . for what it is 
not—not a permanent warrant for our more ideal interests, not a 
fulfiller of our remotest hopes." 2 0 To James's way of thinking, 
then, only the theistic conception of the universe can guarantee 
such hopes. 
The hopes which theism guarantees, moreover, are not fanciful 
or remote. They do not await fulfillment in some distant, unknown 
future. If they did so, James says, they might "mean nothing to 
the sane mind." They would remain, appropriately, beyond the 
bounds of our attention and concern. James's conception of God, 
however, is that of a God who makes a difference throughout our 
life's journey—past, present and future. He writes: "If there be a 
God, it is not likely that he is confined to making differences in 
the world's latter end; he probably makes differences all along its 
course. Now the principle of practicalism says that the very 
meaning of the conception of God lies in those differences which 
must be made in our experience if the conception be true." 2 1 The 
empirical bent of James's pragmatism comes to the fore in this 
remark. The meaning of the concept 'God' is found in the particular 
and concrete differences which the concept makes in the conduct 
of the believer. The superiority of theism's claim shows itself, 
then, not only in a redeemable future, but in the immediacy and 
particularity of the present moment. The pervasiveness of theism's 
cogency is both near and far. And it is a cogency that philosophy 
(i.e. pragmatism) can rationally depict. James says that "the whole 
function of philosophy ought to be to find out what definite 
difference it will make to you and me, at definite instants of our 
life, if this world-formula or that world-formula be the one which 
is true." 2 2 According to James, the world-formula suggested by 
theism makes such a difference, and for that reason it is meaningful 
and true. And, as we shall see in the following section of this 
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paper, the difference which the theistic world-formula makes is 
not only a matter of an open and closed universe, but also one of 
life and death. 
II 
I mentioned earlier James's personal knowledge of the 
struggles and trials that comprise human existence. James is known 
to have wrestled with depression throughout his life, and at a 
particularly difficult time, he even contemplated suicide. 2 3 Thus, 
one cannot help but read James's essay of 1895, "Is Life Worth 
Living?", as a testament to his own struggle and eventual triumph 
over this disease. With clearly autobiographical overtones, the 
essay directly addresses the question of suicide, and attempts to 
offer a rationale for rejecting it. James frames the purpose of the 
essay in the form of a question: "What reasons can we plead that 
might render such a brother (or sister) willing to take up the burden 
again?" 2 4 In framing this question, James is not naive about his 
purpose in the essay, insofar as he is acutely aware that his plea 
cannot be heard by the person for whom "reflection is impotent to 
arrest [depression's] headway." 2 5 The essay, therefore, is not 
intended for those suffering so deeply that they cannot employ 
their rational powers in a significant way. 
Curiously, James casts the problem of suicide in religious 
terms. The melancholic disposition that leads to suicide, James 
says, is an "essentially religious disease." 2 6 On his view, then, the 
disease is due to the contradiction that life presents to the religious 
consciousness. The contradiction is one between the belief in the 
essential concord of the world as a whole (the view that the official 
religions espouse) and its apparent discordant facts. From an 
empirical perspective, the world is a complex assortment of 
discordancies—of triumph and tragedy, good and evil, love and 
cruelty. Furthermore, there seems to be no overarching plan or 
purpose to the wild array of these hard facts. Such facts, James 
writes, "exist in indissoluble partnership; and there gradually steals 
over us, instead of the old warm notion of a man-loving Deity, that 
of an awful power that neither hates nor loves, but rolls all things 
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together meaninglessly to a common doom." 2 7 Caught in this 
contradiction, the religious consciousness becomes susceptible to 
depression and, perhaps, to the contemplation of suicide. In James's 
words, the contradiction becomes for the consciousness of the 
believer a "melancholy-breeding puzzle." 2 8 
James argues that the resolution of this puzzle depends upon 
the activation of two human resources. The first is the heroic 
disposition, which he believes is constitutive of human nature; the 
second lies in the activation of the human disposition to religious 
belief. James appeals first to the heroic or combative disposition. 
This disposition, he believes, runs "deeper" than the melancholic 
disposition, and is able to counteract it. James presents two options 
for the melancholic personality in confronting the "melancholy-
breeding puzzle" that life presents. On the one hand, she may 
reject the "monistic superstition" of a concordant world, allow the 
discordant facts of life to take hold, and without guilt or shame 
choose suicide. On the other hand, however, the melancholic 
person may reject the same superstition, and choose to combat the 
real discordancies that surround her. James, of course, argues for 
the latter option. He writes: "The sovereign source of melancholy 
is repletion. Need and struggle are what excite and inspire us; our 
hour of triumph is what brings the void." 2 9 
In James 's mind, then, we only escape the grip of the 
"melancholic-breeding puzzle" when we actively struggle to make 
the discordant facts of human living more concordant. The option 
for suicide, therefore, is really a pseudo-escape; it only confirms 
the superstition of a concordant world and the puzzle's hold upon 
us. The heroic disposition, to the contrary, does not deny the 
discordance of the present world, but neither does it accept 
discordance as the final word; rather, it chooses to struggle to 
make the world more concordant. That is to say, the heroic 
disposition struggles to make the world different. James records 
historical examples of peoples (such as the Waldenses) who 
displayed great heroism in the midst of horrendous circumstances. 
Inspired by such examples, he offers the following counsel: "Life 
is worth living, no matter what it brings, if only such combats may 
be carried to successful terminations and one's heel set on the 
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tyrant's throat. To the suicide, then, in his supposed world of 
multifarious and immoral nature, you can appeal—and appeal in 
the name of the very evils that make his heart sick there—to wait 
and see his part of the battle out." 3 0 Thus, by exercising the heroic 
disposition, the melancholic personality is able to find an initial 
resolution the puzzle that life presents. 
According to James, however, the appeal to the heroic 
disposition is only a first step; it serves merely as a "half-way 
stage" to an escape from melancholy's hold. Ultimately, an appeal 
to a second disposition is required—i.e., the disposition to religious 
belief. Religious belief, James writes, is the "faith in the existence 
of an unseen order of some kind in which riddles of the natural 
order may be found explained."3 1 Religious belief, then, places its 
trust in the existence of a concordant order that will eventually 
harmonize the discordancies of the present one. For this reason, 
James believes that the appeal to the heroic disposition represents 
only a "half-way stage" towards bringing peace to the melancholic 
personality. In short, the heroic disposition lacks a sense of the 
purpose or telos of the struggle to overcome the discordancies of 
the present world. In James's mind, fighting for the sake of fighting 
is not sufficient. We must ask ourselves, what are we are fighting 
/o r? Religious belief, he maintains, provides the answer by 
affirming that we are fighting for a concordant order. Ultimately, 
the promise of such an order makes the struggle in particular and 
living in general worthwhile. Thus, with the activation of the 
disposition to believe, melancholy's hold is broken—not by 
suicide—but by the belief in an eternal, concordant order, which, 
James believes, is worth struggling to establish. 
It is important to note that James does not attempt to prove the 
existence of this eternal order; rather, he simply argues for the 
right to believe in it. James writes, "I wish to make you feel... that 
we have a right to believe the physical order to be only a partial 
order; that we have a right to supplement it by an unseen spiritual 
order which we assume on trust, if only thereby life may seem to 
us better worth living again." 3 2 Playing the devil's advocate, James 
raises a few possible objections to his claim. The first comes from 
a certain scientific mentality, which might argue against the 
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existence of any order or world other than the present one. 
According to this mind-set, all the fundamental facts of the universe 
are already available, and science simply fills in the picture. But, 
James argues, such a claim actually does violence to the very notion 
of the scientific imagination, and he urges us to consult the history 
of science as a proof. When we examine this history, James 
contends, we see that some of the most significant scientific 
discoveries resulted from "absolutely new" conceptions. Thus, 
taking into account the revolutionary novelty of many scientific 
discoveries, James maintains that the fundamental facts concerning 
the nature of the universe are not already available; they are not, 
as he likes to say, "bagged and captured." Rather, on his view, our 
understanding about the final order of the universe is still unfolding. 
Thus, he declares, "No! our science is a drop, our ignorance a sea. 
Whatever else be certain, this at least is certain,—that the world 
of our present natural knowledge is enveloped in a larger world of 
some sort of whose residential properties we at present can frame 
no positive idea." 3 3 
The second objection that James's raises to his claim that we 
have a right to believe in an ultimately concordant world comes 
from "agnostic positivism." According to this objection, however 
different a future universe might be from the present one, we do 
not have the sufficient evidence to posit it. Curiously, this objection 
agrees with James's contention that all the facts of the universe 
are not yet established. The agnostic positivist objects, however, 
to the right to draw any specific conclusion about the universe's 
ultimate nature. Agnostic positivism contends that we have no 
right to believe one way or the other—whether the ultimate order 
is temporal and discordant or eternal and concordant. Basically, 
agnostic positivism raises an objection on the grounds of 
insufficient evidence. James's response to the objection is 
insightful and humane: no decision of significant import—whether 
in science, ethics, religion, or life in general—is made with 
absolutely conclusive evidence. He claims that our most important 
decisions are always comprised of a number of "maybes." The 
genuine scientist, no less than the person of faith, typically acts 
without absolute certainty, and sometimes risks his reputation and 
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life in the process. For this reason, James says, "Not a victory is 
gained, not a deed of faithfulness or courage done, except upon a 
maybe; not a service, not a sally of generosity, not a scientific 
exploration or experiment or textbook, that may be a mistake. It is 
only by risking our persons from one hour to another that we live 
at all. And often enough our faith beforehand in an uncertified 
result is the only thing that makes the result come true"34 
James's response to the objections raised by science and 
agnostic positivism makes clear his own position. First, we live in 
a universe that is largely "open." Contrary to the first objection, 
James claims that not all the fundamental facts about the universe 
are "bagged and captured," and that significant facts about the 
nature of the universe still await discovery. Against the objection 
raised by agnostic positivism, he argues that sometimes belief is 
the only thing that makes such discovery possible. To put the 
point somewhat simply, we will never know if our conjectures 
about the nature of the universe are true unless we put them into 
practice. In reading James on this point, however, we must be 
careful. He is not saying that believing something makes it true. 
Rather, James argues that oftentimes belief is the only way we can 
even begin to know if something might be true. As Dewey remarks, 
"Moreover it may be that, in order to discover the proofs which 
will ultimately be the intellectual justification of certain beliefs— 
the belief in freedom, for example, or the belief in God—it is 
necessary to begin to act in accordance with this belief."35 The 
most significant questions in life, James maintains, will never be 
sufficiently addressed if we wait for absolutely conclusive 
evidence. On his view, such evidence is rarely (if ever) 
forthcoming. 
The question about the ultimate nature of the universe, and 
our purpose within it, poses such a question. Barring the possibility 
of absolutely conclusive evidence about the nature of the universe, 
our fundamental disposition towards this question makes all the 
difference in the world. On the one hand, for the melancholic and 
suicidal personality, the universe remains a puzzle that only breeds 
despair; the facts are just what they are, and there is nothing we 
can do to change them. For the heroic and believing disposition, 
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on the other hand, the puzzle stands to be resolved (due to the 
heroic disposition), and in an ultimate way (due to the disposition 
to believe). Thus, according to James, the type of disposition we 
bring to the question, "Is life worth living?", is a crucial one, and 
the difference that the disposition to believe makes is crucial. 
Ultimately speaking, it is a difference between life and death. 
"Refuse to believe," writes James, "and you shall indeed be right, 
for you shall irretrievably perish. But believe, and again you shall 
be right, for you shall save yourself. You make one or the other of 
two possible universes true by your trust or mistrust,—both 
universes having been only maybes, in just this particular, before 
you contributed your act." 3 6 
Ill 
In a letter of 1904, written to James Henry Leuba, James reveals 
his own personal position regarding religious belief and God. 
James writes: 
My personal position is simple. I have no living 
sense of commerce with God. I envy those who 
have, for I know the addition of such a sense would 
help me immensely. The Divine, for my active 
life, is limited to abstract concepts which, as ideals, 
interest and determine me, but do so faintly, in 
comparison with what a feeling God might effect, 
if I had one. It is largely a question of intensity, 
but differences of intensity may make one's whole 
center of energy shift.37 
Such a revelation may strike the reader of James as strange, 
especially in light of his consistent defense of the right to believe. 
Is James simply selling himself short? Or, does his lack of "feeling" 
for the Divine express the truth of the matter? And if, indeed, he 
did lack such a feeling, how can we account for the pervasiveness 
of the "religious concern" in his pragmatism? 
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In terms of the first two questions, I would offer the following 
response. First, James is not selling himself short. Although raised 
in the Christian tradition, he ultimately distanced himself from 
any allegiance to a specific religion. Indeed, later in the same 
letter to Leuba, James speaks about growing out of his 
"entanglement" with Christianity. Secondly, in his classic work, 
The Varieties of Religious Experience, James argues that the origin 
of religious belief lies in one's "feeling" for God. "I do believe," 
he writes, "that feeling is the deeper source of religion..."3 8 One of 
the main tasks of Varieties is to document the great diversity of 
such feelings in the lives of particular religious individuals. By 
contrast, theological and/or philosophical conceptions about these 
feelings, James maintains, "are secondary products , like 
translations of a text into another tongue." 3 9 According to James, 
then, the essence and origin of religious belief lies in an individual's 
personal feeling for God. If one has no such feeling or personal 
experience of the Divine, then it is difficult to muster any type of 
authentic belief. James, by his own admission, lacks the necessary 
experiential component that could ground such belief. Thus, in 
response to the first two questions raised above, James is not selling 
himself short. By his own admission, he simply lacks the "feeling" 
necessary for "a living sense of commerce with God." We are left, 
therefore, with the question why he remains such a consistent 
advocate for the importance of religious belief. 
James himself indicates a possible response to this question 
in his letter to Leuba. In the letter, he equates religious belief with 
the possibility of an "energy shift" in the life of the believer. If the 
religious feeling is present in a person, James suggests, it can create 
a difference that is decisive in his or her life. Indeed, we have 
seen instances of such a difference throughout our discussion. We 
have seen, for example, that the concept 'God' means the possibility 
of a world evolving towards triumph rather than tragedy. In a 
world of discordant facts, 'God' is the guarantor of an eternally 
concordant order. His 'omniscience' sees us in the darkness, and 
his 'justice' awards us for our goodness. But perhaps, the most 
dramatic difference the concept 'God' makes in the life of the 
believer—especially for the believer caught in the grip of 
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melancholy and despair—is to see that his life is well worth living. 
In short, James maintains that religious belief provides the 
melancholic or depressed personality the possibility of living anew. 
As John McDermott puts it, "Belief for James is a wedge into the 
tissue of experience, for the purpose of liberating dimensions 
otherwise closed to the agnostic standpoint."4 0 
The agnostic standpoint does not apply to religious experience 
alone. It also applies to our cognitive experience, especially when 
traditional ways of thinking prevent us from considering new and 
different ways. On James's view, pragmatism provides philosophy 
with such a way. More specifically, he claims, pragmatism offers 
a way of mediating between the endless disputes that tend to 
paralyze the philosophical tradition. As he declares in his 
Pragmatism lectures of 1907, "The pragmatic method is primarily 
a method of settling metaphysical disputes that otherwise might 
be interminable. Is the world one or many?—fated or free?— 
material or spiritual?—here are notions either of which may or 
may not hold good of the world; and disputes over such notions 
are unending." 4 1 As we have seen, James claims that we settle 
these disputes by considering the practical differences that each 
of these notions makes in our lives. This is not to say, however, 
that pragmatism settles philosophical disputes once and for all. 
Much to the contrary, James argues that the ideas that settle 
philosophical disputes function well until they meet some new 
experience that calls these ideas into question. This experience, 
in turn, can generate a new idea, and this idea is "adopted as the 
true one." Truth, as James says, 
is always a go-between, a smoother-over of 
transitions. It marries old opinion to new fact so 
as ever to show a minimum of jolt, a maximum of 
continuity. We hold a theory true just in the 
proportion to its success in solving this problem 
of 'maxima and minima.' But success in solving 
this problem is eminently a mat ter of 
approximation. We say that this theory solves it 
on the whole more satisfactorily than that theory; 
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but that means more satisfactorily to ourselves, 
and individuals will emphasize their points of 
satisfaction differently. To a certain degree, 
therefore, everything is plastic.4 2 
James's point is not that everything is "plastic" insofar as 
everything is relative. Rather, he argues that everything is "plastic" 
in that nothing is known with absolute certainty. On James's view, 
our knowledge about ourselves and the world we inhabit is fallible; 
it is, as he puts it in the previous citation, "eminently a matter of 
approximation." 
Always an astute commentator of James, John Dewey offers 
two important reflections for our consideration. First, he reminds 
us that "James was an empiricist before he was a pragmatist, and 
repeatedly stated that pragmatism is merely empiricism pushed to 
its legitimate conclusions." 4 3 Secondly, however, Dewey also 
observes that James's empiricism differs from its more classical 
expression in one crucial aspect. The empirical verification of a 
concept's meaning and truth, according to James, is prospective 
rather than retrospective; he looks to consequent rather than 
antecedent phenomena for the ultimate verification of a concept. 
In other words, James is not primarily concerned with the repetition 
of old facts, but with the creation of new ones. Of course, the 
creation of new facts demands a spirit of belief, since, prior to our 
efforts of testing, we cannot secure the verification we seek. For 
this reason, a religious standpoint is superior to an agnostic one, 
insofar as it provides the disposition necessary for achieving such 
verification. Indeed, Dewey is helpful in reminding us about the 
crucial difference between James's empiricism and that of his 
predecessors. James's stress on the verification of consequent 
phenomena relies, in no small way, upon a spirit of belief for its 
success. For this reason, he remained, throughout his philosophical 
career, a consistent advocate for the importance of religious belief, 
even though he did not consider himself to be a particularly 
religious person. 
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